Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?
Resource type
Author/contributor
- Wilkinson, Michael A. (Author)
Title
Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?
Abstract
The current crisis in Europe recalls the theory and practice of authoritarian liberalism, the idea that in order to protect economic liberalism and respect for fiscal discipline, representative democracy must be curtailed. This configuration was first identified by Hermann Heller in late Weimar as a response to the imperative to maintain the ideological separation of state and economy and presented by Karl Polanyi as conditioned by broader geo-political pressure to maintain the gold standard in the inter-war period. Authoritarian liberalism is now conditioned by conflicting imperatives to maintain the project of the single currency, respect ordo-liberal concerns of moral hazard, and protect 'militant democracy' but only in one country. Does this reflect a broader geo-political disequilibrium, due to tensions between market integration, constitutionalism and democracy?
Publication
European Law Journal
Volume
21
Issue
3
Pages
313-339
Date
May 2015
Journal Abbr
European Law Journal
Language
English
ISSN
13515993
Short Title
Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination
Accessed
2017-05-30, 2:57 p.m.
Library Catalog
EBSCOhost
Citation
Wilkinson, Michael A. 2015. “Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?” European Law Journal 21 (3): 313–39. DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12133.
Discipline
Publication year
Keywords
- authoritarianism
- constitutionalism
- democracy
- equilibrium (economics)
- Europe
- European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 2009-
- HELLER, Hermann, 1891-1933
- liberalism
- POLANYI, Karl, 1886-1964
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