Endogenous Institutions and the Politics of Property: Comparing and Contrasting Douglass North and Karl Polanyi in the Case of Finance
Resource type
Author/contributor
- Davis, Ann E. (Author)
Title
Endogenous Institutions and the Politics of Property: Comparing and Contrasting Douglass North and Karl Polanyi in the Case of Finance
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the work of Douglass North and Karl Polanyi regarding financial institutions associated in market economies. Both implicitly acknowledge the synergy between public and private financial markets, which can serve to solidify an alliance between wealth holders and the state, potentially at the expense of “sociery” at large. This alliance may stimulate growth, according to North, as well as impose the strain of the market, according to Polanyi. Taken together, these insights undercut the classical story of the neutral role of money, as well as the notion of a clear distinction between public and private, politics and markets.
Publication
Journal of Economic Issues
Volume
42
Issue
4
Pages
1101-1122
Date
December 1, 2008
Language
English
ISSN
0021-3624
Short Title
Endogenous Institutions and the Politics of Property
Accessed
2017-01-05, 1:30 p.m.
Library Catalog
Taylor and Francis+NEJM
Citation
Davis, Ann E. 2008. “Endogenous Institutions and the Politics of Property: Comparing and Contrasting Douglass North and Karl Polanyi in the Case of Finance.” Journal of Economic Issues 42 (4): 1101–22. DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2008.11507204.
Discipline
Publication year
Keywords
- economic history
- finance
- NORTH, Douglass
- property
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